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A. Introduction 
This paper is the joint Commission/General Secretariat of the Council contribution 
to a cross-pillar initiative on democracy building in EU external action, launched 
by the Czech and Swedish Presidencies in 2009. A SE/CZ non-paper outlines the 
main  ideas  behind  this  initiative,  whose  stated  purpose  is  to  increase  the 
coherence, effectiveness and credibility of EU support to democracy building.  
This paper takes stock of the tools and instruments the EU has at its disposal to 
build democracy and makes recommendations on how they could be used more 
effectively.  It  should  feed,  together  with  other  inputs,  into  discussions  in  the 
relevant Council bodies leading to a more coherent and overarching EU policy 
framework for supporting democratic reform processes in third countries.   
It aims to complement the work on common elements of democracy carried out by 
the Member States' human rights, democracy and development experts.
1   
This initiative is not about renegotiating existing norms or agreed language as to 
what  constitutes  democracy.  Nor  is  the  aim  to  set  out  new  EU  policies,  or 
introduce  new  conditionality  for  EU  development  aid.  Democracy  and  human 
rights are closely linked, and are based on existing universal norms and values. 
Democracy cannot be exported or imposed from the outside, but locally-driven 
processes  can  be  supported  by  an  appropriate  mix  of  financial  and  political 
instruments tailored to the specific situation of each country. In some cases, this 
will  require  a  sustained  effort  over  many  years;  in  others,  it  may  mean 
strengthening  specific  aspects  such  as  electoral  systems,  over  the  short  and 
medium term. 
Yet  only  democracies  that  deliver  have  appeal  to  their  citizens.  The  EU’s 
democracy building efforts should therefore aim at strengthening the capacity of 
governments and administrations, political actors, civil society organisations and 
other  drivers  of  change  to  meet  people’s  expectations  of  economic  and  social 
well-being  and  their  aspirations  for  political  participation  and  enjoyment  of 
fundamental freedoms. 
It should be noted that a comprehensive assessment of EU democracy support 
would  require  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  effectiveness  and  coherence  of  EU 
action at the (sub-) regional and country level. Such an analysis would, however, 
go beyond the scope of this paper.  
                                                 
1 The rolling report of these discussions was presented to the Council Working Party on Human Rights, 
meeting on 24 June 2009 in the presence of development experts .  
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B. Description and assessment of instruments 
2.1 Overview 
This section briefly describes and assesses the main EU instruments and tools for 
democracy building in third countries. A more detailed description of the instruments 
can be found in the annex. 
Although the Treaties do not define the concept of democracy, they provide the legal 
basis for the EU to pursue the objective of ‘developing and consolidating democracy’ 
in third countries across the various strands of EU external relations. 
The EU uses a whole range of approaches, from political dialogue and diplomatic 
initiatives to specific instruments of financial and technical cooperation to support 
democracy  worldwide.  Country driven  reform  programmes,  in  a  context  of 
legitimacy  and  accountability,  are  at  the  core  of  Commission  and  Member  State 
support strategies. Regular dialogue with governments, parliaments, representatives 
of political, social and economic interests, and with municipal and other decentralised 
authorities, is the basis for the programming and implementation of these strategies. 
The final aim is to engage with a variety of actors in long term processes, leading 
to a progressive consolidation of accountable, effective and democratic institutions 
and the internalisation of democratic principles and practices.   
EU support for democracy takes both a top down and bottom up approach and 
addresses  a  range  of  actors  in  different  sectors.  It  includes  democratic  institution 
building,  helping  to  develop  the  capacity  of  parliaments,  local  government  and 
electoral  processes.  It  also  covers  civil  society  programmes,  including  projects 
supporting non-state actors in their advocacy, information and education activities in 
the areas of human rights and democracy, and in monitoring the actions of public 
institutions.  
In EU development policy, support for democracy is seen in a wider democratic 
governance  perspective  that  includes  exploring  the  possible  links  between 
democratisation and citizen involvement in the political process and a broad range of 
issues  such  as  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  rule  of  law,  addressing 
corruption,  human  security    decentralisation  and  access  to  information.  This  also 
entails  access  to  capable,  transparent,  responsive  and  accountable  basic  public 
services  and  state  institutions  as  well  as  the  promotion  of  sustainable  economic 
growth and social cohesion. The approach should be long-term and based on local 
ownership  engaging  national  and  local  governments  and  all  leading  local 
stakeholders,  including  national  parliaments.  The  EU  strategy  in  this  field  is  also 
moving towards a more systemic approach, creating better synergies between direct 
support to democracy and support to other critical components of State building, such 
as the rule of law and independence of the judiciary, public administration reform, 
decentralisation and local governance and civil society empowerment.  
The instruments and tools at the EU’s disposal are very diverse. They are scattered 
over  the  first,  second  and  even  third  pillar.  Some  are  strategic policy  documents, 
setting our policy framework for and the aims pursued by the EU in its relations with  
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a specific country or region (e.g. the Joint Africa-EU Partnership) or even at a global 
level  (e.g.  the  European  Security  Strategy).  Some  instruments  and  key  strategic 
relationships  are  of  contractual  nature  (e.g.  the  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement, 
political clauses), while others are unilateral or bilateral. 
Other  instruments  are  more  of  an  operational  nature  and  have  been  specifically 
designed  to  implement  EU  policy  in  a  particular  region  or  policy  area.  They  fix 
objectives as well as ways and financial means to achieve them. Here a distinction can 
be made between geographical (e.g. the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Policy Instrument) and thematic financing instruments (e.g. the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights). Some of the ‘operational’ instruments have a 
limited (regional) geographical scope, while others have global reach. In the area of 
the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  both  classic  diplomatic 
instruments, such as demarches or political dialogue, and specific CFSP instruments 
are used. Under the umbrella of the rapidly evolving European Security and Defence 
Policy,  the  EU  deploys  crisis  management  operations  (military)  and  missions 
(civilian). 
In this paper, no attempt is made to establish a typology of instruments and tools. The 
headings  in  this  section  aim  to  guide  the  reader  through  the  catalogue  of  EU 
instruments in a more structured way.  
 
2.2  Geographic/regional policies and instruments 
 
Enlargement (Stabilisation and Association Process) 
The Treaty of the European Union indicates that any European country which respects 
the  principles  of  liberty,  democracy,  respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms,  and  the  rule  of  law,  may  apply  to  become  a  member  of  the  Union. 
Furthermore, the ‘Copenhagen criteria ’ require a candidate country to have stable 
institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities. Therefore, compliance with the political criteria features 
prominently in the Accession and European Partnerships and the situation is detailed 
in the European Commission’s annual Progress reports. Accession also requires the 
candidate country to adapt its administrative and judicial structures so that legislation 
can be implemented and enforced effectively.   
Via the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) the EU provides focused pre-accession 
technical assistance to the candidate countries and to the potential candidates. This 
financial  assistance  is  intended  to  help  beneficiaries  to  introduce  the  necessary 
political, economic and institutional reforms in line with EU standards. A key focus of 
assistance  is  to  support  political  reform,  in  particular  institution  building, 
strengthening  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights,  protection  of  minorities  and  the 
development of civil society.  
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European  eighbourhood Policy (E P) 
The ENP is a foreign policy priority for the EU, with the main strategic objectives of 
achieving  a  prosperous,  stable  and  secure  neighbourhood.  The  policy  offers  our 
neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common 
values, and granting a deeper political relationship and economic integration.  
European   eighbourhood  Action  Plans:  The  centrepiece  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  is  the  bilateral  ENP  Action  Plan.  These  Action  Plans  are 
negotiated with and tailor-made for each country, and define an agenda of political 
and economic reforms based on short and medium-term (3-5  years) priorities. An 
important  part  of  the  political  section,  but  also  the  other  sections,  is  linked  to 
democracy building and support. The incentives on offer, in return for progress on 
relevant reforms, are greater integration with the EU and increased assistance. Twelve 
such ENP Action Plans are being implemented. The political reform agendas of the 
ENP partners are very different, reflecting the varying commitments made and their 
willingness and capacity. In addition, in the east, all ENP partners with Action Plans 
are members of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, making for a particular reform 
agenda linked to the fundamental standards in the EU. In the south, the reform agenda 
is based on the agreed values enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration and takes these 
and UN commitments as benchmarks. Civil society is involved in the preparation of 
progress reports.  
Eastern  Partnership  (EaP)  is  a  complement  to  the  ENP,  but  goes  further  in 
deepening EU engagement with Eastern European neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine). The overall objectives of the EaP are to 
forge closer relations between the EU and its neighbours, bringing a political message 
of  EU  solidarity  alongside  additional,  tangible  support  for  their  democratic  and 
market-oriented  reforms  and  the  consolidation  of  their  statehood  and  territorial 
integrity, and to advance their reform agenda. The expected results include progress in 
implementing agreed reforms; a legislation more in line with the EU acquis; reduction 
of internal economic disparities and increased internal stability. Dedicated meetings, 
called ‘platforms’, will contribute to a structured approximation process, supported by 
comprehensive  institution-building  programmes.  One  of  these  is  devoted  to 
Democracy, good governance and stability. While their individual stages of reform 
differ,  partner  countries  face  similar  challenges  in  developing  stable  democratic 
institutions  and  effective  state  structures  at  the  service  of  their  citizens  and  in 
complying  with  commitments  stemming  from  their  Council  of  Europe  and  OSCE 
memberships. 
Euro Mediterranean  Partnership/Union  for  the  Mediterranean  (EMP/UfM)  is 
the EU’s multilateral forum for dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean Partner 
countries. It is an inclusive Partnership aimed at fostering the creation of an area of 
peace, democracy and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean through partnership-
building measures, joint regional projects, sustainable development and strengthened 
rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights. The multilateral setting of the 
UfM can help address regional challenges in the field of human rights and democracy 
such as the empowerment of civil society, gender equality, freedom of expression, 
deepening  regional  dialogue  and  cooperation  in  elections  or  identifying  areas  of 
common ground in legislative and regulatory reform in the field of political pluralism.  
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While there are many positive achievements, much remains to be done to realise the 
full potential of the Barcelona and Paris Declarations, and progress has been uneven, 
especially in the area of political reform.  
Governance Facility (GF): On the basis of the ENP progress reports, funds under the 
Governance  Facility are awarded to provide additional financial assistance for the 
countries that advance most with domestic reforms. GF does not measure absolute 
levels of governance but makes a relative measure, assessing the level of ambition and 
progress against agreed commitments. Ambition and commitments vary from country 
to  country,  so  a  fully  consistent  approach  with  quantifiable  indicators  cannot  be 
developed.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  baseline  country  allocations  already  take 
account of governance-related indicators. If future allocations are more closely tied to 
the governance and democracy building of a given country, the GF could be included. 
Cross border cooperation (CBC) operates for the benefit of the populations on both 
sides of the EU’s external border. The core policy objectives of CBC are to support 
sustainable  development,  to  help  improve  living  standards,  and  to  address  the 
challenges and opportunities that are common to regions on both sides of our land and 
sea  borders.  In  particular,  CBC  is  intended  to  promote  economic  and  social 
development; address common challenges in fields such as environment, public health 
and the prevention of and fight against organised crime; ensure efficient and secure 
borders;  and  to  promote  local  cross-border  ‘people-to-people’  actions.  CBC 
programmes can stimulate local democracy and promote good governance at local 
level. The programming process is participatory and bottom-up and thus promotes 
democracy at ‘grassroots level’. Joint projects encourage sharing of best practices 
between local actors and ultimately improve local governance. The CBC programmes 
are still in their initial implementation phase. It is premature to assess the relevance of 
CBC for democracy building.  
Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP)  
The  Cotonou  Agreement  is  the  basis  for  political  dialogue  and  technical  and 
financial  cooperation  through  the  European  Development  Fund  (EDF)  for  ACP 
countries. . Democracy, human rights and the rule of law, constitute the essential, 
contractual, elements of the Cotonou Agreement which are enshrined in article 9 of 
Cotonou.  
Article 8 provides for a regular, comprehensive and in-depth political dialogue with 
all  ACP  countries  and  defines  its  objectives  and  scope.  This  dialogue  promotes, 
among other aims of a broader agenda, a stable and democratic political environment 
via the exchange of information, by fostering mutual understanding and by defining 
common priorities and shared agendas in these domains. Assessment is difficult, as 
there is too little factual information available at this stage on how Article 8 deals 
with democracy building issues. In general, political dialogue with ACP countries 
under  Article  8 helps to  improve  consistency  and  regularity.  Efforts  are  currently 
being made to strengthen political dialogue. It has proved successful around electoral 
periods in certain countries (Ghana, Malawi) with a positive influence on process 
The  European  Development  Fund  (EDF)  is  the  main  financial  instrument  for 
geographical cooperation with ACP countries. Out of the €22 billion of 10th EDF  
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(2009-2013),  €13.5  billion  are  allocated  to  countries  according  to  criteria  of 
population, income per capita, other needs and performance criteria and governance-
related criteria. Country allocations form the financial envelope for implementing the 
CSP/NIP, which is negotiated, agreed and signed by the partner government and the 
EC.  Consultations  with  non-state  actors  and  local  authorities  in  the  country  are 
provided for in the Cotonou Agreement. In 2009-2010 the mid-term review of 10th 
EDF  CSP/NIP  will  take  place.  Country  performance  will  be  assessed  regarding 
governance,  the  economic  situation,  poverty  reduction  /  social  situation  and 
implementation of EC cooperation. An overall assessment may lead to changes in the 
strategy and a decision to increase, maintain or decrease the country allocation. 
There are a number of elements of the 10th EDF financial support which are directed 
at  democracy  building,  including  support  for  development  and  consolidation  of 
democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and civil society organisations (CSOs). The EDF financial and technical 
assistance programmes in support of democratic governance and more specifically in 
support  of  democracy  have  focused  on  five  areas  (i)  promoting  fair,  free  and 
transparent electoral processes; (ii) strengthening the institutions and organisational 
capacities  of  parliaments;  (iii)  promoting  independent  and  professional  media  (iv) 
encouraging genuinely pluralistic political systems (v) capacity development for in-
country non-state actors (NSA). Reviews have indicated a substantial impact in terms 
of institutional capacity building over the medium-term period, thanks to enhanced 
accountability, capability and responsiveness.  
Governance-related criteria for aid allocation to ACP countries are encapsulated in the 
Governance Initiative. This is the main incentive-based instrument for enhancing 
dialogue  and  progress  on  issues  of  democratic  governance  in  ACP  states.  The 
Governance Initiative is first of all a new and dynamic incentive mechanism that has 
given  ACP  partner  countries  access  to  additional  funding  on  the  basis  of  their 
commitments  to  achieve  concrete  results  in  their  democratic  governance  reform 
programmes.  It  is  therefore  based  on  a  contractual  approach.  The  analysis  of  the 
situation  is  supported  by  a  country-level  Governance  Profile  that  provides 
international  and  national  indicators  on  nine  areas  of  democratic  governance.  The 
Governance Initiative is innovative in terms of the process, the instruments and the 
tools and suits the EU policy approach to supporting democratic governance. It is an 
initiative that has good potential to promote reforms owned by partner countries and 
to  facilitate  dialogue  between  partners.  The  outcome  of  the  respective  national 
Governance Action Plans (GAPs) will be assessed in the upcoming mid-term review, 
which will provide more information about the effective implementation of the GAPs 
and  about  changes  in  the  governance  situation  in  the  countries  concerned. 
Implementation of GAPs and evolution of the governance situation are indeed the two 
criteria to assess country performance in the area of governance in the 10th EDF mid-
term review.  
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Global 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
The DCI was conceived as an enabling Instrument to provide development assistance, 
planning and delivery to all OECD/DAC ODA recipient countries, aiming to alleviate 
poverty  and  achieve  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDG),  delivering 
sustainable economic and social development and gradually integrating developing 
countries into the world economy. Consolidation of and support for democracy are 
stated  objectives  of  the  DCI,  amongst  other  cross-cutting  issues  such  as  good 
governance,  the  rule  of  law,  human  rights,  gender  equality,  children’s  rights, 
indigenous peoples, environment and sustainable management of  global resources, 
combating HIV/AIDS. 
There are five geographic programmes (Asia, Latin America, Central Asia, Middle 
East and South Africa), with varying degrees of emphasis on democracy building 
according to the regional programme. They fund a great number of projects directly 
relevant for democracy building. There are also five thematic programmes, including 
the one on ‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’ (see below). The 
forthcoming mid-term review of DCI will provide a clearer picture of its impact on 
democracy building. 
Cooperation with regional/international organisations 
Cooperation with regional organisations, the UN and other partners is an important 
vehicle for the EU’s democracy building activities and can enhance the effectiveness, 
geographical  reach  and  credibility  of  EU  action.  Many  regional  organisations  are 
working to consolidate democracy amongst their members and some have adopted 
normative instruments to that effect (e.g. Inter-American Democratic Charter and the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance) 
The EU cooperates closely with the Council of Europe and the OSCE/Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in areas related to promoting 
and  protecting  pluralistic  democracy,  respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law.  
The  EC  is  full  party  to  the  unique  global  instrument  against  corruption,  United 
Nations  Convention  against  Corruption.  The  instrument  requires  development  and 
implementation  of  policies  reflecting  among  others  the  principles  of  rule  of  law, 
proper  management  of  public  funds,  integrity,  accountability  and  transparency. 
Therefore, the EU cooperates with the UN in promoting worldwide accession to it and 
its effective implementation.  
The African Union has become a key international partner of the EU, including on 
democracy and human rights. Following the adoption of the Joint Africa/EU Strategy 
in December 2007, eight thematic partnerships were created, including an Africa-EU 
Partnership  on  Democratic  Governance  and  Human  Rights  to  enhance  dialogue 
between  Africa  and  the  EU  and  to  consolidate  the  Pan-African  Governance  and 
Human Rights Architecture. In this framework, enhanced cooperation with the AU is 
anticipated  in  the  area  of  electoral  observation  (exchange  of  good  practice,  
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observation of European elections by AU). In addition, the dedicated EU-AU Troika 
dialogue on human rights provides a platform to discuss democracy-related issues. 
The appointment of a ‘double-hatted’ EU Special Representative/Commission Head 
of  Delegation  to  the  African  Union  reflects  the  shared  wish  of  the  Council  and 
Commission to combine all the instruments of the EU and thereby ensure a joined-up 
approach to Africa at all levels. 
Another  important  dimension  of  EU  policy  has  been  to  strengthen  international 
instruments of human rights and international justice. In multilateral fora, the EU 
coordinates its members’ positions so it can speak with one voice in UN human rights 
fora  such  as  the  Human  Rights  Council  and  the  UN  General  Assembly’s  Third 
Committee. 
This is not the case for intergovernmental or international fora on democracy, such as 
the Community of Democracies, the Forum for the Future of Democracy (Council of 
Europe) or the International Conference on New and Restored Democracies. 
The EU cooperates with other regional partners which share the values of democracy 
and  the  rule  of  law,  for  instance  with  ASEAN  and  some  of  its  members  (e.g. 
Indonesia, Philippines) in promoting democracy in Burma/Myanmar. 
 
2.3  Cross cutting and thematic policies and instruments 
 
Human  rights  and  democracy  (HRD)  clauses.  Since  1995,  the  European 
Community  has  systematically  included  a  standard  ‘human  rights  and  democracy 
clause’ as an essential element of non-sectoral/mixed agreements concluded with third 
countries
2. Consultations in case of breach of essential elements can be an efficient 
instrument,  by  linking  EU  cooperation  to  progress  on  respect  for  the  essential 
elements,  democracy  in  particular,  and  EU  cooperation.  This  efficiency  may  also 
explain why it has not been necessary to resort to the suspension mechanism in the 
case of other third countries or as a basis to suspend trade concessions. 
Political  dialogue  and  human  rights  dialogues.  The  Union  has  developed  a 
substantial  network  of  political  dialogue  commitments  ranging  from  expert  to 
ministerial level. In addition, there are currently more than 30 dialogues, consultations 
and  Agreement-based  subcommittees  dedicated  solely  to  human  rights.  The 
confidential setting of these dialogues enables frank and constructive discussions and 
exchanges of views on a regular basis, even when more visible means and channels 
are not viable. Human rights dialogues systematically address specific human rights 
issues  relevant  to  building  sustainable  democratic  societies,  though  democracy 
building as such is rarely addressed. There is also scope to better coordinate dialogues 
conducted under different pillars in addressing human rights and democracy issues.  
                                                 
2   Doc. 7255/95 ‘Human rights clauses in Community agreements with non-member countries’.  
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Justice,  Liberty  and  Security  (JLS)  Subcommittees  are  established  in  the 
framework  of  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreements  and  Partnership  and 
Cooperation  Agreements  with  third  countries  (ENP,  pre-accession  and  other 
countries). They represent a key instrument for the promotion of the rule of law and 
the protection of human rights since they cover issues including the judiciary and 
justice reform, anti-corruption, fight against terrorism and organised crime, visa and 
borders  policies,  migration,  and  law  enforcement  cooperation.  The  differences 
between  the  countries  concerned  do  not  permit  a  comprehensive  assessment  of 
performances.  However,  the  format  remains  a  key  feature  for  addressing  general 
justice and home affairs issues (rule of law, separation of powers, independence of the 
judiciary) as well as policies with a direct and strong impact on citizens’ liberties and 
daily problems (such as freedom of movement, visa policies). 
EU Guidelines on human rights
3 cover issues of particular importance to the EU 
and offer practical guidance on implementation. The Guideline dealing with human 
rights defenders is of particular  relevance to democracy  building, since it aims at 
supporting  and  protecting  groups  and  individuals  who  can  be  important  local 
democracy actors. The Guidelines are most effective when local strategies have been 
established and are duly implemented by Commission Delegations and diplomatic 
missions of EU Member States in third countries. Efforts to make the Guidelines 
known to human rights defenders in third countries should also be intensified. 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
4: The general 
objectives of the EIDHR are to contribute to the development and consolidation of 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  all  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms within the framework of relevant EU policies. EIDHR is global in scope and 
aims to enhance democratic development through the strengthening of civil society 
actors and strategic cooperation with international organisations, by addressing issues 
such  as  rule  of  law  and  international  justice,  and  by  its  focus  on  promoting 
fundamental freedoms.  
Building on its key strength, which is the ability in principle to operate without the 
need for host government consent, EIDHR is able to focus on sensitive political issues 
and  innovative  approaches  and  to  cooperate  directly  with  local  civil  society 
organisations which need to preserve independence from public authorities. EIDHR 
can also be active in countries that may be described as ‘difficult partnerships’, in 
countries and regions where fundamental freedoms are most at risk, where geographic 
programmes  may  meet  obstacles.  In  this  respect,  EIDHR  complements  other 
Instruments, though its strategic use needs to be further articulated and developed. 
EIDHR has made considerable provisions for  country-specific small-scale projects 
(Country  Based  Support  Schemes  —  CBSS)  in  order  to  further  enhance  local 
ownership and improve access by civil society organisations from the countries and 
regions  concerned.  Election  Observation  Missions  (EU  EOM)  are  also  funded 
under  EIDHR.  EU  EOMs  involve  assessing  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  an 
electoral process and presenting recommendations that will help to decide on further 
                                                 
3  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=822&lang=EN. 
4   Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 20.12.2006, OJ L 386, 
29.12.2006, p.1 (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/working-documents_en.htm).  
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assistance  after  the  elections.  EU  Election  Observation  Missions  (EU  EOM)  are 
deployed worldwide (except OSCE area).  
 on state actors and local authorities in development: This is an ‘actor-oriented’ 
thematic programme under DCI, aiming to help build capacity by supporting ‘own’ 
initiatives from non-state actors (NSA) and local authorities in the EU and partner 
countries. Priorities include promoting an inclusive and empowered society in partner 
countries to facilitate non-state actors’ and local authorities’ participation in strategies 
for poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
This  programme  is  a  useful  instrument  to  enhance  democracy  building  in  partner 
countries in that it aims to support civil society actors and local authority institutions 
and should allow them to interact better with states. However, given its limited budget 
(around 200 million per year) it might be seen as a complementary instrument to 
support  actions  undertaken  under  geographic  programmes.  During  the  mid-term 
review  that  will  take  place  in  the  coming  months,  ways  of  improving 
subsidiarity/complementarity with geographical programmes will be explored in order 
to reinforce the impact of the programme. 
Council conclusions and CFSP statements/declarations and demarches. While not 
legally  binding,  Council  conclusions  and  ‘CFSP  Declarations  by  the  Presidency  on 
behalf of the European Union’
5 are important instruments for defining and implementing 
the  CFSP.  They  often  address  issues  of  democracy  and  elections.  The  impact  of 
conclusions/declarations  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  receptivity  of  the  target 
country/audience. They have a high degree of visibility and contribute to the gradual 
shaping  of  EU  external  policy.  Demarches  provide  an  opportunity  to  deliver 
politically sensitive messages directly to third country authorities behind closed doors, 
thus avoiding the ‘loss of face’ often associated with public declarations.  
Restrictive  measures  (sanctions).  The  European  Union  may  apply  sanctions  or 
restrictive measures
6 against third countries, entities or individuals in pursuit of the 
specific CFSP objectives set out in Article 11(1) TEU, including the development and 
consolidation of ‘democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental  freedoms’.  They  are  normally  used  as  part  of  an  integrated, 
comprehensive  policy  approach  combining  pressure  (‘sticks’)  with  incentives 
(‘carrots’) and regularly reviewed in order to assess if they are still justified with 
regard  to  the  objectives  stated.  Concrete  examples  of  EU  autonomous  sanctions 
applied  in  recent  years  as  levers  for  democratic  change  and  the  improvement  of 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  include  those  imposed  on  Belarus, 
Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, and Burma/Myanmar. Any assessment needs to be carried out 
on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the specific objectives of the sanctions 
regime as laid down in the relevant legal act and in line with the Guidelines.  
                                                 
5  ‘Presidency statements’ are sometimes used in situations of particular urgency but they do not   reflect 
the position of the Union as a whole. 
6   Sanctions or restrictive measures (the two terms are used interchangeably) can be imposed by 
the  EU  either  on  an  autonomous  EU  basis  or  implementing  binding  Resolutions  of  the 
Security Council of the United Nations.  
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EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed by the Council and entrusted 
‘with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues’. They provide the EU with an 
active political presence in troubled or post-conflict countries and regions, promoting 
peace, stability and the rule of law
7. Many EUSRs de facto contribute to democracy 
building objectives even though this is not always made explicit in their mandates. 
The  model  of  ‘double-hatted’  EUSRs
8  in  the  Western  Balkans  is  interesting  in 
ensuring better coordination and coherence between various EU instruments deployed 
in the region and has also been applied to the newly created post of EUSR/Head of 
Delegation to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa. 
Situations of Fragility: The EU response to situations of fragility is not specifically 
geared towards democracy building. Current thinking focuses rather on the notion of 
state building, which is understood as an endogenous process to enhance the capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relations. Democracy 
as  such  is  promoted  in  this  framework  by  means  of  political  dialogue  and  peace 
building activities, and by supporting state institutions that observe the requirements 
of democratic governance.  
 
2.4  Crisis management policies and instruments 
 
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS)
9 recognises that ‘The best protection 
for  our  security  is  a  world  of  well-governed  democratic  states.  Spreading  good 
governance,  supporting  social  and  political  reform,  dealing  with  corruption  and 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best 
means of strengthening the international order.’ 
Most if not all the instruments available to implement the objectives of the Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  can  be  used  for  the  purposes  of  democracy 
building. Any meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP instruments 
for democracy building should be done on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
that: (i) the development and consolidation of democracy is but one of several CFSP 
objectives and (ii) instruments are seldom used in isolation but deployed as part of a 
wider strategy towards a country or region.   
                                                 
7   Article 18(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for the appointment by the Council of 
Special  Representatives.  According  to this  provision,  a  special  representative  is  entrusted  ‘with a  mandate  in 
relation to particular policy issues’ and thus acts, within the limits of the mandate, as a representative of the 
European Union (EU), notwithstanding the role of the Presidency as representative of the Union on all CFSP 
matters under Article 18(1) TEU.1. 
. 
9   ‘A  secure  Europe  in  a  better  world:  The  European  Security  Strategy’  (approved  by  the  European 
Council on 12/13 December 2003) ) and Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World (approved by the European Council on 
11/12 December 2008).  
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EU  crisis  management.  The  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP)  has 
expanded rapidly as regards the diversity of its actions, their geographic scope and the 
number of missions and operations. While democracy building is not a stated aim of 
ESDP missions as such, many EU crisis management operations/missions contribute 
to building democratic states, democratic governance and the rule of law. Democracy 
building  and  security  are  mutually  reinforcing:  a  certain  degree  of  stability  is 
necessary for democratic institutions and processes to develop. EU crisis management 
missions and operations can contribute to providing a safe and secure environment for 
democracy to take root. On the other hand, democracy is a tool for conflict prevention 
and resolution. Stability over the long term can only be ensured through legitimate, 
representative government, the rule of law and respect for human rights. EU crisis 
management is never a  stand-alone operation but is embedded in wider efforts to 
bring  about  political  change.  Efforts  to  mainstream  human  rights  and  gender  into 
ESDP from the first missions in 2003 to today have also started to bear fruit: for 
instance, there is now a compilation of relevant texts for mission planners and it is 
established practice that new missions have a human rights and/or gender advisor as 
part of their staff.  
Instrument for Stability — Crisis Response (IfS).
10 The IfS is a new Instrument 
and  its  crisis  response  component  builds  on  its  predecessor,  the  Rapid  Reaction 
Mechanism. It is global in scope with the main objective to contribute to stability by 
providing an effective initial response to help preserve, establish or re-establish the 
conditions essential to the proper implementation in the long run of the Community’s 
development and cooperation policies. This in complementarity with other EC and 
EU instruments in the framework of broader stabilisation strategies. Typically, the IfS 
can be mobilised in the event of a major new political crisis or natural disaster, a 
window  of  opportunity  to  pre-empt  a  crisis  or  advance  on  conflict  resolution  or 
alongside CFSP / ESDP actions.  
The IfS operates from a crisis response and conflict mitigation perspective, but is also 
designed  to  support  democracy  building,  especially  in  fragile  and/or  post-conflict 
settings, as an integral part of conflict resolution and stabilisation, The IfS has been 
mobilised  at  short  notice  mainly  in  support  of  urgent  needs  to  contribute  to 
meaningful and credible electoral processes in post-conflict and fragile crisis settings. 
This includes direct support to electoral bodies and civil society actors in the run-up to 
elections  in  Lebanon,  Haiti,  Chad,  Moldova,  Fiji,  Nepal,  Zambia,  Georgia  and 
Zimbabwe.  
African Peace Facility (APF): The APF is based on the recognition that peace and 
security are preconditions for sustainable development. The general objective of the 
APF is to contribute to peace, stability and security in Africa through targeted support 
to African efforts at continental and regional level in the areas of peace building and 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
                                                 
10 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 
2006, OJ L 327, 24.11.2006, p. 1. (see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifs/index_en.htm 
and  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:327:0001:0011:EN:PDF).  
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The  APF  can  also  support  democracy  building,  especially  in  fragile  and/or  post-
conflict settings, as an integral part of conflict resolution and stabilisation, as in the 
Comoros and in support of mediation efforts related to electoral crises.  
C.  Examples of the EU’s approach to democracy building 
The following examples illustrate how different EU instruments can work together. 
3.1.  Enlargement 
Clearly,  enlargement  has  been  the  EU’s  most  successful  democracy  promotion 
strategy, combining strong incentives with conditionality. In 2005, eight countries of 
Central and Eastern European became EU members having undergone a transition 
from  authoritarian  rule  to  consolidated  democracies  in  less  than  15  years.  These 
countries also bring with them a remarkable democratisation experience which could 
be put at the service of third countries on the road to democracy. Enlargement is, of 
course, where the principles and values upon which the EU is founded, most closely 
intersect with its external policies. The EU has a vital interest in ensuring that future 
members apply and internalise these principles and values and it therefore deploys the 
full array of instruments to assist future members on their path to democracy.  
The main objective of current EU engagement in the Western Balkans is the building 
of stable, democratic states with  a view to their possible integration into the EU. 
Helping these countries comply with the Copenhagen criteria through the Stabilisation 
and Association process is one of the key policy objectives of both first and second 
pillar instruments in the region. Pre-accession technical assistance is intended to help 
(potential)  candidate  countries  to  introduce  the  necessary  political,  economic  and 
institutional reforms in line with EU standards. A key focus of assistance is to support 
political  reform,  in  particular  institution  building,  strengthening  the  rule  of  law, 
human rights, protection of minorities and the development of civil society. ‘Second 
pillar  instruments’,  notably  ESDP  missions/operations  and  EU  Special 
Representatives (EUSRs) have an important role to play both by contributing to the 
development of a secure and stable environment for democracy to develop and by 
intervening directly in areas linked to democratic development, such as the rule of law 
and  police  reform.  The  EU  Police  mission (EUPM)  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
(BiH) aims to establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service in 
BiH through mentoring, monitoring, and inspecting. It also increasingly focuses on 
fighting  organised  crime  and  corruption  as  key  spoilers  of  state-building  efforts. 
EULEX  KOSOVO,  with  some  1700 international  staff  the  largest  civilian  ESDP 
mission to date, aims to support the Kosovo
11 authorities by monitoring, mentoring 
and advising in all areas related to the rule of law, covering in particular  the judiciary, 
police,  customs  and  correctional  services.  EULEX  also  disposes  of  an  executive 
mandate. The ‘double-hatted’ role of EUSRs
12 in the Western Balkans helps to ensure 
                                                 
11 Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99 
12   The  EUSR  for  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  also  heads  the  European 
Commission Delegation; the EUSR for BiH has been appointed High Representative for BiH 
by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, and the EUSR for Kosovo (under 
UNSCR 1244) is International Civilian Representative with the task of promoting overall EU 
political coordination.  
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better coordination and coherence between various EU instruments deployed in the 
region.  
However, despite this success story, there are still important challenges in the Western 
Balkans, where post-conflict stabilisation and democratisation are work in progress. 
In  line  with  the  renewed  consensus  on  enlargement  established  in  the  European 
Council  in  December  2006,  the  current  enlargement  agenda  cover  the  western 
Balkans and Turkey. Beyond these countries, enlargement has geographical and other 
limits  (integration  capacity).  Different  strategies  to  encourage  democracy  building 
have to be found and the newly launched Eastern Partnership, which includes a strong 
democracy dimension, is an attempt to ‘beef up’ the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). Progress with regard to political reform and democratisation in the Southern 
Neighbourhood has been uneven so far.  
3.2 EU support to electoral processes 
 
Elections are a key step in the democratic process, representing a crucial opportunity 
for political participation and representation as well as the full enjoyment of a wide 
range  of  human  rights.  EU  support  to  electoral  processes  combines  EU  Election 
Observation missions, electoral assistance projects, political instruments and, in some 
cases, ESDP missions. EU election observation is an integral part of the EU’s external 
action and perhaps the most visible part of EU democracy building efforts around the 
world.   
Past  experience  has  shown  that  free  and  fair  elections  are  not  sufficient  to  set  in 
motion  a  democratic  virtuous  cycle:  short-term  interventions  covering  a  specific 
election  have  limited  effectiveness  and  sustainability  compared  to  long-term 
investments in the whole electoral process. EU electoral assistance is more likely to 
have a durable impact when EU observation missions and electoral assistance are 
based on a long-term electoral cycle approach
13 and embedded in an overall strategy 
promoting democracy, peace and security before, during and after an election.  
More strategic planning is desirable, in order to effectively combine instruments that 
aim at strengthening elections and democratisation processes. Electoral assistance and 
election observation by the EU are independent but complementary activities. They 
are implemented by different services within the Commission, in close coordination 
with the Council, the European Parliament and the Member States. Various financial 
instruments (mainly geographic instruments) are used for funding electoral assistance, 
which  is  the  legal,  technical  and  logistic  support  provided  to  enhance  democratic 
electoral processes and EU EOMs (the latter being centrally managed, and funded 
under EIDHR). Electoral assistance support covers a broad range of actions aiming at 
improving the legal framework for the administration of elections, strengthening the 
institutions  (Electoral  management  bodies),  supporting  public  outreach  and  media 
                                                 
13  The electoral cycle approach is outlined in the Methodological Guide on electoral assistance 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/EC_Methodological_Guide_on_Electoral_Assista
nce.pdf.  
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communications activities as well civil society  organisations engaged in civic and 
voter  education,  domestic  election  observation  and  media  monitoring.  Election 
observation  and  the  recommendations  formulated  by  EU  EOMs  provide  useful 
guidance to technical assistance beyond Election Day, in order to prepare for the next 
electoral cycle and inform EU foreign policy. Efforts are currently under way to bring 
EU assistance more into line with the recommendations and other lessons learned 
from election observation, for example in the mid-term reviews of Country Strategy 
Papers. 
Effective EU support for elections requires a coherent approach through: 
•  the mutually reinforcing use of both Community and CFSP instruments, 
•  thorough assessment of the political situation in the country,  
•  the potential effect of EU electoral observation on both the future democratic 
situation in the country and the EU’s relationship with it.  
Early planning and consultation with the competent Council bodies, also involving 
EU HoMs and experts, will enhance the ability of the EU to develop a more coherent 
and comprehensive approach. 
There  is  a  clear  division  of  roles  between  EU  institutions  as  regards  election 
observation by the EU
14. The role and the political repercussions of the elections, and 
hence the role of the EU in relation to election observation, has been steadily growing. 
Case study: the 2006 elections in the DRC illustrate how different EU instruments 
can work together to support an electoral process.
15 Diplomatic support helped pave 
the way for the holding of the elections, support for key institutions provided a basis 
for  electoral  success,  Community  support  for  the  election  process  was  the  largest 
Community  contribution  ever  to  an  election  process  (around  €165  million  for 
electoral assistance and €8 million for EUEOM referendum and elections) in addition 
to €100 million of bilateral support provided by EU member states. An ESDP military 
operation (EUFOR RD Congo) was launched in support of the UN Mission in order 
to contribute to a secure environment during the election process. In addition, the EU 
already had two civilian missions on the ground, an EU police mission in Kinshasa 
(EUPOL  KI SHASA)  and  an  advisory  and  assistance  mission  for  DRC  security 
sector reform. 
 
D.  Recommendations  
The overview and examples of the use of instruments above clearly show that the ‘EU 
toolbox’ for democracy building is both large and diverse. The EU is already engaged 
in a multitude of activities that contribute, directly or indirectly  and with varying 
degrees of success, to democracy building in third countries. The issue, therefore, 
seems  to  be  not  about  inventing  new  tools,  but  about  ‘sharpening’  existing 
instruments and using them in a more coordinated fashion.  
                                                 
14   cf. Council Conclusions on Election assistance and observation of 31 May 2001. 
15   http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/90508.pdf.  
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1.  Country specific approach 
Democracy building takes place in a variety of contexts. Some countries are already 
on the path towards democracy. In others, there is a little or no political will by the 
political  leadership  to  effectively  move  towards  democratic  change.  In  countries 
emerging from or threatened by conflict or in situation of fragility, the international 
community may find itself engaged in democracy building as part of ‘state-building’ 
and stabilisation efforts. These factors, together with the individual characteristics of 
each country, will determine the type and level of EU engagement as well as the best 
mix of instruments to be used. 
Analysis 
Democracy building is a complex, long-term process touching the very heart of a 
country’s sovereignty. Any outside support to this process should therefore take as its 
starting  point  an  in depth  analysis  of  a  country’s  situation  with  regard  to 
democracy.  
•  Any EU action should be based on a deep understanding of the local context, 
preferably produced by relying on local information sources to the extent possible, 
and be specifically tailored to it (not a ‘one size fits all’ approach).  
•  The  country  analysis  should  draw  on  existing  analytical  tools  developed  by 
various EU actors. These include governance profiles (for ACP countries), HoMs 
reports, EUSR reports and human rights factsheets. The various tools should be 
used to complement each other better. Where necessary, they should address the 
issue  of  democracy  in  a  more  systematic  way,  taking  account  of  the 
recommendations of EU EOMs when appropriate. Analytical tools developed by 
external actors should also be considered when relevant. 
•  Regarding the governance profile, efforts are under way to involve Member States 
at all stages of the process in a timely manner, in order to have the profile used 
more  intensively  as  an  EU  tool  and,  where  appropriate,  in  bilateral 
programming
16.  
•  Country Strategy papers (CSP) should address the issue of democracy more 
systematically  and  draw  on  the  analytical  tools  mentioned  above.  Wherever 
appropriate,  an  analysis  of  the  state  of  democracy  should  be  built  into  other 
existing CSP chapters such as the political chapter or the human rights chapter. 
Level of engagement 
The EU’s strategy towards a country or region, and the specific situation of each 
country, will determine to what extent the EU can or wants to become engaged in 
democracy  building.  The  willingness  and  commitment  of  a  country’s  political 
leadership to advance along the path of democracy also need to be taken into account. 
                                                 
16 May 2009 Council conclusions.  
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•  Democracy vs. other policy objectives. The development and consolidation of 
democracy is just one of several objectives of the EU’s external policies, so it 
cannot be the sole and  overriding consideration in the use of EU instruments. 
However, it is necessary to ensure that democracy building does not lose out to 
short-term considerations in cases where it is a long-term objective of the EU.  
•  Even  in  situations  where  democracy  building  is  not  the  first  priority,  the  EU 
should  avoid  any  actions  that  harm  or  undermine  long-term  prospects  for 
democracy in a country or region. Democracy should be integrated firmly into a 
policy framework where it is a recognised and confirmed objective, together with 
the other objectives listed in Art 11 TEU, and where short-term concerns do not 
systematically override or harm the long-term objective of democracy building. 
•  If the EU decides to engage in democracy building in a given country, it needs to 
be prepared to follow through and be committed for the long term.  
Appropriate mix of instruments 
The best mix of instruments for democracy building should be determined based on 
the EU Strategy towards a country, the aforementioned analytical tools and of course 
the country-specific situation. Both short-term measures and long-term development 
approaches have their place in the toolbox.  
•  Integrating  cross cutting  issues  (‘mainstreaming’).  While  democracy  is 
‘mainstreamed’ into most EU policies and instruments, this has not necessarily 
translated into impact or progress on the ground. Democracy building tends to get 
lost amongst a plethora of other cross-cutting issues. More ‘mainstreaming’ is not 
necessarily the answer to achieving more effectiveness or even coherence. What is 
needed  is  a  tailor-made,  country-specific  approach  which  uses  the  most 
appropriate  mix  of  instruments  to  further  democracy-building  objectives  and 
principles such as transparency, accountability, participation and inclusion.  
•  In  countries  already  on  the  path  to  democracy,  the  EU  should  continue  to 
engage in electoral support, dialogue, support to civil society and media as well as 
paying due attention to supporting relevant institutions such as parliaments and 
other representative bodies, political party fora, ombudsperson’s offices and press 
councils. 
•  In countries whose government resists democratic change and where fundamental 
rights and freedoms do not exist or are severely restricted, it may still be possible 
to discuss certain issues related to democracy with the government, such as the 
rule of law and respect for human rights. In cases where the suspension clause of 
an  agreement  is  invoked  (such  as  Article  96  of  Cotonou),  democracy-related 
issues feature prominently in the political dialogue. In parallel, or in cases where 
such discussions are not possible, the EU works with alternative actors, mostly 
non-state  actors,  as  part  of the more  innovative  approaches  needed  to  support 
‘democracy actors’ in the country, promote access to information and free media, 
and foster people-to-people contacts.   
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•  In  fragile  or  post conflict  situations,  ESDP  crisis  management  missions  and 
operations,  together  with  more  long-term  instruments,  can  play  a  role  in 
stabilisation.  The  provision  of  political  advice  to  government  authorities,  for 
instance in the areas of security sector reform or the rule of law, is a strategic lever 
for democratic change. Community ‘flanking measures’ can complement ESDP 
actions and continue the work once the crisis management mission or operation 
has completed its task.  
•  In all cases, the EU is committed to the equal participation of men and women in 
democratic  life.  Some  ways  of  achieving  this  are  specific  civic  education 
campaigns  for  women  and  gender-specific  quotas.  Youth,  making  up  a 
considerable share of the population in many countries, is a potential force for 
change  and  should  be  addressed  through  specific  action,  for  example  in  the 
education sector.  
2.   Dialogue and partnership 
Building true partnerships based on dialogue and consultation ensures ownership of 
democratic processes.  
•  Democracy building should, wherever possible, be treated as an item in its own 
right in EU dialogues with partner countries. 
•  A number of dialogues are often ongoing at country level dealing, in a more or 
less coordinated manner, with aspects pertaining to democracy  and democracy 
building
17.  Efforts  should  be  made  to  use  these  different  dialogues  in  a  more 
consistent and coordinated manner.  
•  The EU should continue its established practice of looking for innovative ways to 
involve civil society, political parties and other non-governmental political players 
in  the  dialogues  (e.g.  the  organisation  of  CSO  events  prior  to  human  rights 
dialogues, Article 8 dialogues, etc.). 
3.   EU Coherence and coordination 
Policy  coherence  and  coordinated  use  of  instruments,  both  within  and  across 
‘pillars’ are challenges which are not specific to democracy building. They derive 
from  institutional  structures  and  the  division  of  competences,  and  have  been 
addressed  in  previous  EU  policy  documents  aiming  to  increase  the  coherence, 
effectiveness and visibility of EU external action within the present Treaty context. 
Many  of  the  proposals  contained  in  these  documents  are  designed  to  increase 
consistency and coherence between different policy areas and instruments, but are 
also relevant for democracy building.  
•  Enhancing coherence and coordination between different actors and instruments 
calls for closer coordination at the decision-making level and at country level. 
                                                 
17   e.g.  political  dialogues,  local  troika  dialogues,  human  rights  dialogues,  human  rights  sub-
committees,  JLS  sub-committees,  Cotonou  Art.  8  dialogues,  PCA  dialogues,  Strategic 
Partnership Action Plan dialogues, programming dialogues, etc.  
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This should start from the country analysis stage and continue from the planning 
to the implementation phase.   
•  At the decision-making level, early and regular exchange of information between 
the Commission, Member States and/or the relevant Council bodies according to 
established procedures in prioritising, planning, preparation and implementation 
of initiatives contributing to democracy promotion (in particular measures under 
Instrument for Stability and EU EOMs) are essential to ensure consistency with 
the EU’s foreign policy objectives and complementarity with other EU activities. 
The  relevant  Council  bodies  should  be  fully  involved  and  closely  follow  and 
discuss strategic orientations for enhancing democracy-building efforts in specific 
countries, including by receiving Commission and/or EOM Chief Observer de-
briefs on the progress and outcome of EU EOMs 
•  Systematic and timely follow-up to recommendations by the EU EOMs could be 
ensured through more coherent use of Community and CFSP instruments through 
better implementation of the 2001 Council conclusions on Election assistance and 
observation. EU EOM recommendations could be used as a reference to identify 
areas where assistance can be provided to the authorities and non-governmental 
stakeholders. 
•  At  the  country  level,  improved  information  sharing  and  better  coordination of 
planned and ongoing activities in the area of democracy building among the EC 
Delegations, ESDP missions or operations, EUSRs and the Embassies of the EU 
Member States would bring synergies with tangible effects on the ground. 
•  An EU policy framework for democracy support can only achieve its full potential 
if the  Member States’  policies  and  activities  contribute  to and  support  such  a 
framework.  
4.  Cooperation with other actors 
•  Cooperation  with  regional  organisations,  the  UN  and  other  partners  should  be 
recognised and promoted as an important vector for the EU’s democracy building 
activities  and  a  way  to  enhance  the  effectiveness,  geographical  reach  and 
credibility of EU action. 
•  The EU should encourage the exchange of best practices, particularly at regional 
level,  and  support  relevant  mechanisms  (such  as  the  African  Peer  Review 
Mechanism), wherever available, to lay the ground for improved cooperation with 
other international and regional stakeholders. 
•  EU  EOM  recommendations  to  improve  electoral  processes  should  be 
systematically used as a key input for dialogue with other donors at country level. 
5.  Visibility 
Lack of coordination and dispersion of efforts by multiple EU actors and initiatives 
can lead to poor visibility of EU action.  
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•  Visibility should not be considered an end in itself but should be consistent with 
the purposes of EU democracy-building efforts. In some countries, keeping a low 
profile may be more effective.  
•  More visibility could be given to democracy issues in various EU annual reports, 
including development cooperation, country reports and the EU Report on Human 
Rights, for instance by including a separate section on EU support to democracy 
building.  
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Annex 
Geographic/regional policies and instruments  
 
- Enlargement/SAP/Pre-accession 
- European Neighbourhood Policy 
- Africa, Caribbean, Pacific 
  -  Cooperation  with  third  countries  and  regional/international 
organisations  
 
Horizontal/cross cutting (and thematic) policies and instruments 
 
-.Human Rights and democracy clauses 
-.Political dialogue and Human rights dialogues 
-.JLS Subcommittees 
-.EU Guidelines on Human Rights 
-.EIDHR, incl. EU EOMs 
-.Non State Actors  
-.Council conclusions, declarations and demarches 
-.Restrictive measures (sanctions) 
-.EUSRs 
-.Situations of fragility 
Crisis management policies and instruments 
   
  - ESS 
  - ESDP missions/operations 
  - Instrument for Stability 
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Geographic/regional instruments and policies 
 
Enlargement (Stabilisation and Association Process)  
The Treaty of the European Union indicates that any European country which respects 
the  principles  of  liberty,  democracy,  respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms,  and  the  rule  of  law,  may  apply  to  become  a  member  of  the  Union. 
Furthermore, the ‘Copenhagen criteria ’ require a candidate country to have stable 
institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities.  
Therefore, compliance with the political criteria features prominently in the Accession 
and European Partnerships and the situation is detailed in the European Commission’s 
annual Progress report.   
Accession also requires the candidate country to have created the conditions for its 
integration  by  adapting  its  administrative  structures  and  that  the  legislation  is 
implemented  and  enforced  effectively  through  the  appropriate  administrative  and 
judicial structures. The candidate countries and potential candidates’ institutions and 
decision-making processes need therefore to be effective and to be in a position to 
continue financing its policies in a sustainable manner. Most importantly, they need to 
be accountable as well. 
Furthermore,  while  democratic  principles  and  values  are  mainly  realised  through 
political  institutions  and  practices  they  are  also  often  shaped  by  national  history, 
culture, social and economic factors. It is therefore a multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary 
process which needs to be addressed holistically both top down e.g. development of 
legislation, and bottom up e.g. by grass root initiatives and pilot actions.  
The  EU  provides  focused  pre-accession  financial  aid  to  the  candidate  countries 
(currently: Croatia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and to 
the  potential  candidates  (Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Montenegro,  Serbia, 
Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution  1244). This financial assistance is 
intended  to  help  beneficiaries  to  introduce  the  necessary  political,  economic  and 
institutional reforms in line with EU standards. A key focus of assistance is to support 
political  reform,  in  particular  institution  building,  strengthening  the  rule  of  law, 
human rights, protection of minorities and the development of civil society. 
It is on this basis that a limited number of areas have been identified for IPA support, 
either at national or multi beneficiary level. Assistance focuses on Democracy and the 
Rule  of  Law,  including  Public  Administration  reform,  Human  Rights  and  the 
Protection  of  Minorities,  Regional  Issues  and  International  Obligations,  and  Civil 
Society Dialogue and Development.  
This support to the area of Political criteria, while varying from country to country 
and multi-beneficiary can represent around 30 % of annual budget allocations.  
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European  eighbourhood Policy (E P) 
•        European   eighbourhood  Action  Plans:  The  centre  pieces  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy are the bilateral ENP Action Plans. The Action Plans are 
negotiated  with  and  tailor-made  for  each  country,  and  define  an  agenda  of 
political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) 
priorities. An important part of the political section, but also the other sections, is 
linked to democracy building and support. The incentives on offer, in return for 
progress on relevant reforms, are greater integration with the EU and increased 
assistance. Twelve such ENP Action Plans are being implemented — with Israel, 
Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and Ukraine, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and Lebanon and Egypt. The political reform 
agenda  of  the  ENP  partners  is  highly  differentiated,  reflecting  the  varying 
commitments made and their willingness and capacity. In addition, in the east, all 
ENP partners with Action Plans are members of the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe, which contributes to a particular reform agenda linked to the fundamental 
standards in the EU. In the south, the reform agenda is based on the agreed values 
enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration and takes these and UN commitments as 
benchmarks. Civil society is involved in the preparation of progress reports.  
•      Eastern  Partnership  (EaP)  is  a  complement  to  the  ENP,  but  goes  further  in 
deepening  EU  engagement  with  Eastern  European  neighbours  (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine). The overall objectives of 
the EaP are to forge closer relations between the EU and its neighbours, bringing a 
political message of EU solidarity alongside additional, tangible support for their 
democratic and market-oriented reforms and the consolidation of their statehood 
and territorial integrity, and to advance their reform agenda by: (1) Support to 
partner  countries  reforms  through  a  Comprehensive  Institution-Building 
programme  (CIB)  addressing  all  relevant  sectors  of  cooperation;  (2)  An  EaP 
Multilateral  dimension,  including  support  for  a  restricted  number  of  flagship 
initiatives; (3) Addressing economic and social disparities between regions within 
a  partner  country  and  increasing  their  internal  cohesion  through  supporting 
economic  and  social  development.  The  expected  results  include  progress  in 
implementing  agreed  reforms;  a  legislation  more  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis; 
reduction  of  internal  economic  disparities  and  increased  internal  stability. 
Dedicated  meetings,  so  called  platforms,  will  contribute  to  a  structured 
approximation  process,  supported  by  the  comprehensive  institution-building 
programmes.  One  of  these  is  devoted  to  Democracy,  good  governance  and 
stability.  While  their  individual  stages  of  reform  differ,  partner  countries  face 
similar challenges in developing stable democratic institutions and effective state 
structures  at  the  service  of  their  citizens  and  in  complying  with  commitments 
stemming from their Council of Europe and OSCE memberships. The work under 
this  platform  will  include  governance  peer  reviews  and  exchanges  of  best 
practices to address issues such as electoral standards, regulation of the media or 
combating corruption. Panels will be established under each thematic platform, to 
support the latter’s work in specific areas. The Commission intends to supplement 
the current ENPI envelope with €350M in addition to the appropriations already  
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programmed for the period 2010-13. In order to address the most immediate needs 
the ENPI Regional Programme East will be refocused with approximately €250 
million to kick-start activities. As the first meeting of the platform on democracy 
will only take place on 5 June, it is too early to analyse the impact on democracy 
building in the region. 
•  Governance Facility (GF): On the basis of the ENP progress reports, funds under 
the  Governance  Facility  are  awarded  in  order  to  provide  additional  financial 
assistance for the countries that advance most with domestic reforms. A specific 
feature of the GD is that it is not measuring absolute levels of governance but 
makes a relative measure, assessing the level of ambition and progress against 
agreed commitments. Ambition and commitments vary from country to country. 
Therefore,  a  fully  consistent  approach  with  quantifiable  indicators  cannot  be 
developed. It should be noted that the baseline country allocations already take 
into account governance-related indicators. If future allocations are in even higher 
degree based upon the governance and the democracy building of a given country, 
the GF could be subsumed herein 
•       Cross border cooperation (CBC) operates for the benefit of the populations on 
both sides of the EU’s external border. The core policy objectives of CBC are to 
support sustainable development, to help improve living standards, and to address 
the challenges and opportunities that are common to regions on both sides of our 
land and sea borders. In particular, CBC is intended to promote economic and 
social development; address common challenges in fields such as environment, 
public  health  and  the  prevention  of  and  fight  against  organised  crime;  ensure 
efficient and secure borders; and to promote local cross-border ‘people-to-people’ 
actions.  CBC  programmes  can  stimulate  local  democracy  and  promote  good 
governance at local level. The programming process is participatory and bottom 
up and thus promotes democracy at ‘grassroots level’. The implementation of joint 
projects fosters the exchange of best practices between local actors and ultimately 
leads to improving local governance. Measures financed, in particular under the 
last  objective  ‘people-to-people’  actions  have  a  direct  impact  on  democracy 
building. The CBC programmes are still in their initial implementation phase. It is 
premature to assess the relevance of CBC for democracy building.  
Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) 
In the ACP region The Commission employs three main instruments to support the 
democratization  process  in  third  countries:  political  dialogue,  mainstreaming  of 
democratic values and dedicated financial and technical assistance programmes. This 
includes (i) Political dialogue measures encourage partner governments to integrate 
democracy  and  human  rights  as  part  of  their  development  plans  and  identifies 
opportunities  for  EC  assistance  to  contribute  to  those  objectives;  (ii)  Support  to 
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of respect for 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  are  reflected  in  the  association  and 
partnership agreements that the EU concludes with third countries.; and  (iii) The 
Commission's  financial  and  technical  assistance  programmes  at  supporting 
democratic governance and more specifically with a democracy building focus on five 
key areas: promoting fair, free and transparent electoral processes; strengthening the 
institutional and organisational capacities of parliaments; promoting an independent  
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and  professional  media;  encouraging  genuinely  pluralistic  political  systems;  and 
capacity development for Non State Actors (NSA) 
 
•  Cotonou Agreement: The Agreement is the basis for political dimension/political 
dialogue (article 8), as well as, the European Development Fund (EDF), which 
provides the financial envelopes to support the fulfilment of the regular Country 
Strategy  Papers  for  the  ACP  states.  The  political  dimension  of  the  Cotonou 
Agreement  relevant  for  democracy  primarily  relates  to  articles  8  (political 
dialogue), 9
18 (essential elements and their link to articles 96/97) and annex VII. 
Article 8 foresees a regular, comprehensive and in depth political dialogue with all 
ACP countries and defines its objectives and scope. The objectives of the dialogue 
are  to  exchange  information,  foster  mutual  understanding  and  define  common 
priorities and shared agendas. It should promote a stable and democratic political 
environment.  
•  European Development Fund: Co-operation with the ACP countries is governed 
by the Cotonou agreement
19 which is in provisional application since September 
2000.The  resources  for  development  co-operation  with  the  ACP  countries  are 
channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF). The implementation 
of  the  EDF  is  subject  to  rules  laid  down  in  the  Implementing  Regulation  n. 
617/2007.  The  Cotonou  Agreement  entered  into  force  on  1
st  July  2008. 
Comprehensive guidelines for programming of the 10th EDF (2008-2013) guide 
the process of allocation of resources in partnership with the partner government 
on the basis of an agreed and ratified Country Strategy Paper (CSP). There are a 
number  of  elements  of  the  10th  EDF  financial  support  which  are  directed  at 
democracy  building  including  support  to  development  and  consolidation  of 
democracy and the rule of law and of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are reflected in the association and partnership agreements that the EU 
concludes with third countries.  
•  Governance  Initiative  is  the  main  incentive-based  instrument  for  enhancing 
dialogue and progress on issues of democratic governance in ACP states.. €2.7 
billion  from  the  10
th  European  Development  Fund  were  set  aside  for  such 
incentives:  the  so-called  "governance  incentive  tranche".  It  is  supported  by  a 
country-level  Governance  Profile  that  provides  international  and  national 
indicators  on  key  elements  of  democratic  government  including  accountability, 
responsiveness  and  capability.  The  partner  country  is  encouraged  to  undertake 
relevant,  ambitious  and  credible  commitments  for  reform  and  put  forward  a 
Governance Action Plan.  For Africa in particular, this approach has furthermore 
                                                 
18 Annex VII foresees that in framework of an intensified political dialogue on essential elements, joint 
agendas and priorities may be agreed, specific benchmarks or targets be developed. 
19 The Cotonou Agreement (CA) states
1 that "financial cooperation between the ACP State and the 
Community shall be sufficiently flexible to ensure that operations are kept constantly in line 
with the objectives of this Agreement and to take account of any changes occurring in the 
economic situation, priorities and objectives of the ACP State concerned".  
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led to an enhanced Africa/EU dialogue on governance issues in the framework of 
the Joint Strategy and Action Plan for 2008-2010
20.  
Cooperation with third countries and regional/international organisations 
Cooperation with like-minded partners and international or regional organisations is 
an important vector for the EU’s democracy building activities which can enhance the 
effectiveness, geographical reach and credibility of EU action.  
In May 2007, the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Council of Europe. It foresees that the two organisations will continue to develop 
and deepen their relations in all areas of common interest, in particular the promotion 
and protection of pluralistic democracy, the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the rule of law, political and legal cooperation, social cohesion and cultural 
interchange. The OSCE/ODHIR is another important partner in Europe, especially 
on election monitoring.  
The African Union has become a key international partner of the EU on issues such 
as  crisis  management  and  the  promotion  of  peace,  stability,  democracy  and 
development. Following the adoption of the Joint Africa/EU Strategy in December 
2007, EU support focused on work towards Africa-led and Africa-owned approaches. 
In addition to the partnership on ‘Democratic Governance and Human Rights’ (see 
above), the dedicated EU-AU Troika dialogue on human rights provides a platform to 
discuss democracy-related issues. The appointment of a ‘double-hatted’ EU Special 
Representative/Commission  Head  of  Delegation  to  the  African  Union  reflects  the 
common will of the Council and Commission to combine all the instruments of the 
EU and thereby ensure a coherent approach towards Africa at all levels. 
Another  important  dimension  of  EU  policy  has  been  to  strengthen  international 
instruments of human rights and international justice. The EU has been a major 
supporter  and  advocate  of  the  International  Criminal  Court.  But  while  the  EU 
coordinates its positions with a view to speaking with one voice in UN human rights 
fora such as the Human Rights Council and the UNGA Third Committee, this is not 
the case for international fora on democracy, such as the Community of Democracies, 
the  Forum  for  the  Future  of  Democracy  (Council  of  Europe)  or  the  International 
Conference on New and Restored Democracies. 
The US has been a principle partner for the EU on democracy building, although there 
has been a marked difference of approach especially under the last US administration. 
During the last annual EU US Summit (June 2008) ‘promoting peace, human rights 
and  democracy  worldwide’  was  among  the  three  main  areas  identified  for 
                                                 
20 An assessment was recently carried out by the Commission and Council Conclusions SEC(2009) 58 
Final. The Governance Initiative (the process, the instruments and the tools) is innovative and 
well adapted to the EU policy approach to supporting democratic governance. It seems to be 
an initiative that has good potential to promote reforms owned by partner countries and to 
facilitate  dialogue  between  partners.  The  main  shortcomings  of  this  Governance  Initiative 
process lie in the uncertainties and changes in the method in the months immediately after the 
process was launched.   
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cooperation.  Nevertheless,  there  was  close  coordination  with  regard  to  certain 
countries, for instance on Belarus.  
The EU cooperates with other regional partners who share the values of democracy 
and  the  rule  of  law,  for  instance  with  ASEAN  and  some  of  its  members  (e.g. 
Indonesia, Philippines) in promoting democracy in Burma/Myanmar. 
Horizontal/cross cutting (and thematic) policies and instruments 
•  Human  rights  and  democracy  (HRD)  clauses
21.  Since  1995,  the  EU  has 
systematically included a standardised ‘human rights and democracy clause’ as an 
essential  element  of  non-sectoral/mixed  agreements  concluded  with  non-
industrialised third countries
22. The clause now features in agreements covering 
more than 120 countries, including the Cotonou Agreement which has been signed 
with  78  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  states.  The  clause  has  been 
generally complemented by a suspension mechanism providing for the possibility 
of suspending the agreement or parts thereof, including without prior consultation 
in  the  case  of  ‘special  urgency’.  A  review  of  past  practice  regarding  the 
application  of  the  suspension  mechanism  shows  that  the  EU  has  invoked  the 
clause only on occasions of significant and dramatic regression from the status 
quo — notably flawed elections or a coup d’état — by ACP countries only
23. The 
suspension mechanism has never been used in the case of other third countries or 
as a basis to suspend trade concessions. In more recent agreements, HRD clauses 
have been complemented by provisions on human rights cooperation, which has 
led  to  the  establishment  of  Commission-led  Joint  Committee  Sub-groups  on 
human rights in a number of countries (e.g. Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and 
Laos).  
•  Political dialogue and Human Rights dialogues
24. The Union has developed a 
substantial  network  of  political  dialogue  commitments  ranging  from  expert  to 
ministerial level. Political dialogue provides an opportunity to raise issues relating 
to  democracy  with  the  authorities  of  third  states  in  a  confidential  setting.  In 
addition, there are currently some 37 dialogues and consultations dedicated only to 
human rights which come in various formats, including structured human rights 
dialogues (e.g. China), agreement-based dialogues stemming from human rights 
clauses  in  various  agreements  (e.g.  ENP  Association  Agreements),  troika 
consultations  with  like-minded  countries  (e.g.  US,  Canada,  Japan)  and  ad-hoc 
dialogues  including  local  Troika  dialogues.  In  some  countries,  Troika  HR 
dialogues  operate  in  parallel  with  agreement-based  dialogues  stemming  from 
human rights clauses in a Cooperation agreement (e.g. Vietnam). EU Guidelines 
on  Human  Rights  dialogues  with  third  countries
25  list  the  ‘promotion  of  the 
processes  of  democratisation  and  good  governance’  among  the  issues  to  be 
discussed. Human rights dialogues systematically address specific human rights 
issues relevant to building sustainable democratic societies including respect for 
freedom  of  expression  and  information,  including  media,  the  right  to  peaceful 
                                                 
21 Human rights and democracy clauses feature both in Community and mixed agreements. 
22 Doc. 7255/95 ‘Human rights clauses in Community agreements with non-member countries’. 
23 Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement has been invoked in at least 20 cases since 1995. 
24 these instruments are not specific to the CFSP but can be employed under all 3 pillars of the Union. 
25   Doc. 16526/08 (revised Guideline adopted by AGRI Council on 19 January 2009).  
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assembly, the situation of human rights defenders, the functioning of civil society 
as  well  as  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights  such  as  health  or  education. 
Democracy is seldom addressed as such, even though rule of law issues including 
the reform and independence of the judicial system, as well as the electoral law are 
addressed in a number of human rights dialogues. There is scope to better integrate 
the  recommendations  of  EU  Election  Observation  missions  in  human  rights 
dialogues.  
•  JLS  Subcommittees:  JLS  Subcommittees  are  established  in  the  framework  of 
Stabilization  and  Association  Agreements  and  Partnership  and  Cooperation 
Agreements with third countries. Currently they are in place (sometimes with a 
different  name  and  format)  with  Russia,  Ukraine,  Moldova,  Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan,  Georgia,  Croatia,  Turkey,  FYROM,  Albania,  Serbia,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  Montenegro,  Kosovo,  Morocco,  Jordan,  Israel,  Tunisia,  Algeria, 
Egypt, Lebanon. As they cover issues as judiciary and justice reform, fundamental 
rights, anti-corruption and fight against organized crime, visa and borders policies, 
migration, and law enforcement cooperation, they represent a key instrument for 
promotion of rule of law and protection of human rights in the dialogue with third 
countries,  as  cornerstones  of  democracy  building.  The  differences  between  the 
countries concerned do not permit a comprehensive assessment of performances. 
However, the format remains a key feature for addressing general justice and home 
affairs issues (rule of law, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary) as 
well  as  policies  with  a  direct  and  strong  impact  to  citizens'  liberties  and  daily 
problems (such as freedom of movement, visa policies), both at a political/senior 
officials level and at working operational level. 
•  EU Guidelines on human rights cover issues of particular importance to the EU 
and  offer  practical  guidance  on  implementation.  Since  1998,  the  Council  has 
adopted eight sets of Guidelines
26 of which the one dealing with Human Rights 
Defenders is perhaps of particular relevance to democracy building. It is aimed at 
supporting and protecting individuals, groups and organs in society that seek the 
promotion and protection of universally recognised human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Such groups and individuals are often vocal advocates for democracy or 
democratic principles and can play a prominent role in locally-driven processes 
towards establishing or consolidating democracy. Commission Delegations and 
diplomatic missions of EU Member States in third countries have a crucial role in 
the  concrete  implementation  of  the  EU  guidelines.  Local  strategies  have  been 
established  in  around  60  countries,  but  there  is  scope  to  step  up  efforts  to 
implement the strategies in certain countries or to extend the number of countries 
having a local implementation strategy. Reflections are ongoing on whether the 
strategies  should  be  made  public  to  enhance  their  visibility  and  facilitate  the 
participation of local civil society actors. 
•  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
27: EIDHR 
was  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  in  December  2006 
replacing the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, which was 
created at the initiative of the European Parliament in 1994. EIDHR is global in 
                                                 
26  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=822&lang=EN. 
27   Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 20.12.2006, OJ L 386, 
29.12.2006, p.1 (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/working-documents_en.htm).  
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scope  and  operates  at  national,  regional  and  international  levels,  supporting 
actions carried out in third countries throughout the world, and also in Member 
States if relevant to needs in third countries. The general objectives of EIDHR  are 
to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of 
law  and  respect  for  all  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  within  the 
framework  of  the  Community’s  policy  on  development  cooperation  and 
economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, consistent with 
the European Union’s foreign policy as a whole. The 2007-2010 Strategy paper 
sets out five specific EIDHR objectives: 1) Enhancing respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in countries and regions where they are most at risk; 2) 
Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic 
reform, supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and consolidating 
political participation and representation; 3) Supporting actions on human-rights 
and democracy issues in areas covered by EU guidelines, including dialogues on 
human rights, human-rights defenders, the death penalty, torture, and children and 
armed  conflict;  4)  Supporting  and  strengthening  the  international  and  regional 
frameworks for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the 
promotion  of  democracy;  and  5)  Building  confidence  in  and  enhancing  the 
reliability  and  transparency  of  democratic  electoral  processes,  in  particular 
through  election  observation.  EIDHR  aims  to  enhance  democracy  promotion 
through strengthening civil society organisations, through addressing issues such 
as rule of law, international justice, through its focus on fundamental freedoms 
among  others,  and  also  through  the  inclusion  of  political  foundations  and 
parliamentary bodies among its applicants. This instrument is designed to help 
civil society to become an effective force for  political, democratic reform and 
defence of human rights. In doing this, it clearly complements the new generation 
of  geographical  programmes,  which  focus  on  public  institution-building. 
Flexibility  and  increased  capacity  to  respond  to  changing  circumstances  or  to 
support  innovation,  plus    independence  of  action,  since  it  does  not  need  the 
consent of the governments of the countries concerned for the financing activities, 
are  among  the  features  that  gives  EIDHR  a  clear  added  value  in  its  work  on 
democracy building. This added value could however be even further articulated. 
According  to  its  regulation  "Democracy  and  human  rights  are  inextricably 
linked".  This  means  that  most  EIDHR  actions  aim  both  at  protection  and 
promotion of human rights as well as to democracy building. In order to further 
strengthen  democracy  building,  EIDHR  has,  since  2002,  made  a  considerable 
increase of its in country specific small scale projects (Country Based Support 
Schemes - CBSS) in order to further enhance local ownership and improve access 
by civil society organisations from the countries and regions concerned. There is 
an increasing number of projects at country level being selected by Delegations, 
which  targets  NGOs  that  do  monitoring  of  elections  and  awareness-raising 
campaigns in relation to electoral processes in their countries. 
•  EU  Election  Observation  Missions  (EU  EOMs)  are  financed  under  the 
Community budget, through EIDHR, within a budgetary limit of 25% of annual 
expenses. Since 2000 over 60 EU EOMs were conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East.  
EU  EOMs  are  characterised  by  long-term  presence  in  the  host  country  and 
country-wide  deployment  of  observers.  The  EU  methodology  also  implies  a  
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rigorous, comprehensive and independent assessment of the main features of an 
election  process,  such  as  the  legal  framework,  electoral  campaign  or  media 
situation, as well as public statements on the election process and its compliance 
with international standards as set out in major international and regional Human 
Rights instruments. EU EOMs vary in size according to the specific conditions 
(geography, demography and electoral system) of the country observed (usually 
missions are of a size of 80 - 150 observers).  
There is a well established division of roles between EU Institutions that reflects 
good inter-institutional cooperation and complementarities. The EU EOM Chief 
Observer  is,  in  nearly  all  cases,  a  sitting  MEP,  and  EP  observer  delegations 
integrate into the EU EOMs. Individual long-term and short-term observers are 
selected  through  an  established  system  of  co-operation  between  EU  Member 
States and Commission. Planning, prioritisation and execution of EU EOMs is 
coordinated with the Council in order to ensure consistency with the EU's foreign 
policy  objectives,  by  consulting  the  competent  Council  bodies  on  EU  EOM 
priorities, keeping them fully informed along the electoral process. Commission 
services supervise the implementation and look after the follow up of EU EOM 
recommendations; follow-up to the findings and recommendations of an EU EOM 
can also be, as appropriate, followed up in the political dialogue.  Local Member 
States  embassies  and  EC  Delegations  as  well  are  closely  involved  in  the 
preparation and follow-up of an EU EOM, to draw on their local expertise and 
with a view to achieving a consistent EU approach towards democracy building.  
Past  experience  has  shown  the  limitations  in  terms  of  effectiveness  and 
sustainability of short term interventions covering only a specific electoral event. 
Such  limited  support,  often  through  temporary  or  “ad  hoc”  institutions  and 
massive deployment of international expertise, yields little effective knowledge 
transfer or capacity building to ensure the sustainability of the electoral process, 
the independence and transparency of the electoral management bodies (EMB) 
concerned and the consequent democratic development of the recipient country. 
To respond to these challenges, the EC has adopted a longer term strategy of 
support  to  the  overall    electoral  cycle  approach  using  the  results  of  the  EU 
independent  observation  missions  as  a  basis  for  designing  electoral  assistance 
projects funded on the geographical instruments of cooperation. 
•   on State Actors and Local Authorities in development: Set up by Article 14 
of the DCI, the thematic programme ‘Non State Actors and Local Authorities in 
development’  is  an  ‘actor-oriented’  thematic  programme  aimed  at  capacity 
building through support to ‘own’ initiatives from non-state  actors (NSA) and 
local  authorities  originating  from  the  EU  and  partner  countries.  For  the  entire 
period 2007-2013, the DCI foresees a maximum indicative amount of EUR 1, 639 
million of which EUR 63. 495 million has been included for ENPI countries
28. For 
the 4 first years of the programme, 2007-2010, a maximum amount of EUR 903. 
                                                 
28 The programme makes a special case for ENPI countries. In article 38 of the DCI, a total indicative 
amount of EUR 465 million has been foreseen for thematic programmes to finance activities 
that benefit ENPI countries. In line with this article, funding of EUR 63.495 million has been 
foreseen for ENPI countries in this thematic programme. See tables in section 5.4 and 5.5 for 
breakdown by objective.  
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316  million  has  been  foreseen  of  which  EUR  30.  6  million  benefit  ENPI 
countries.
29 Priorities include promotion of an inclusive and empowered society in 
partner countries to facilitate non-state actors and local authorities’ participation in 
poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies. This programme seems 
to be a useful instrument to enhance democracy building in partner countries in so 
far as it aims at reinforcing civil society actors and local authorities institutions 
and should allow them to better interact with states. However given the limited 
financial amount it has been entrusted with (around 200 millions per year) it might 
be  seen  as  a  complementary  instrument  to  support  actions  undertaken  under 
geographical programmes. During the mid-term review that will take place in the 
coming  months,  ways  of  improving  subsidiarity/complementarity  with 
geographical programmes will be explored in order to reinforce the impact of the 
programme. 
•  Council conclusions and CFSP statements/declarations and demarches. While 
not legally binding, Council conclusions and ‘CFSP Declarations by the Presidency 
on behalf of the European Union’
30. are important instruments in the definition and 
implementation of CFSP. The Council also expresses an agreed EU position through 
public Democracy and elections regularly feature in Council conclusions and CFSP 
declarations  which  are  widely  publicised  and  therefore  highly  visible  for  the 
outside  world.  They  can  convey  strong  messages  of  condemnation  or 
encouragement for all to hear and are instrumental in clarifying and articulating 
the EU position. This contributes to the gradual shaping of EU external policy. 
The  impact  of  conclusions/declarations  will  to  a  large  extent  depend  on  the 
receptivity of the target country/audience. Demarches provide an opportunity to 
deliver politically sensitive messages directly to third country authorities behind 
closed  doors,  thus  avoiding  the  ‘loss  of  face’  often  associated  with  public 
declarations.  
 
•  Restrictive measures (sanctions). The European Union may apply 
31 sanctions or 
restrictive measures against third countries, entities or individuals in pursuit of the 
specific  CFSP  objectives  as  set  out  in  Article  11(1)  TEU,  including  the 
development and consolidation of ‘democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’. They are normally used as part of an 
integrated,  comprehensive  policy  approach  combining  pressure  (‘sticks’)  with 
incentives (‘carrots’). The EU seeks to garner wide international support for EU 
autonomous sanctions so as to enhance their effectiveness and prefers the use of 
targeted (‘smart’) sanctions, such as arms embargoes, visa bans and the freezing 
of funds so as to maximise impact on those whose behaviour one wants to change 
while reducing any adverse humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for 
the  general  population  or  neighbouring  countries.  Sanctions  are  regularly 
reviewed in order to assess if they are still justified with regard to the objectives 
                                                 
29 See tables in section 5.4 and 5.5 for breakdown by objective. 
30   ‘Presidency statements’ are sometimes used in situations of particular urgency but they do not 
  reflect the position of the Union as a whole. 
31 Sanctions or restrictive measures (the two terms are used interchangeably) can be imposed by the EU 
either  on  an  autonomous  EU  basis  or  implementing  binding  Resolutions  of  the  Security 
Council of the United Nations.  
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stated. Concrete examples of EU autonomous sanctions applied in recent years as 
levers  for  democratic  change  and  the  improvement  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms include those imposed on Belarus, Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, 
Burma/Myanmar. They have been eased/tightened in response to developments on 
the ground. Any assessment needs to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in 
accordance with the specific objectives of the sanctions regime as laid down in the 
respective legal act and in line with the Guidelines. ‘Lessons’ from designing and 
implementing restrictive measures feed the regular policy debates in geographical 
Council Working Groups (and/or PSC/Coreper) on the introduction, extension, 
suspension or termination of sanctions regimes. A ‘sanctions formation’ of the 
Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) develops best practice on 
implementation of restrictive measures.  
 
•  EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed by the Council and entrusted 
‘with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues’. They act, within the limits 
of the mandate, as a representative of the European Union
32 under the authority 
and  operational  direction  of  the  SG/HR.  Currently,  eleven  EUSRs  cover  the 
following  countries/regions:  Afghanistan,  the  African  Great  Lakes  Region,  the 
African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Kosovo (under UNSCR 
1244), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Middle East, Moldova, 
the  South  Caucasus  and  Sudan.  They  provide  the  EU  with  an  active  political 
presence  in  troubled  or  post-conflict  countries  and  regions,  promoting  peace, 
stability and the rule of law. Mainstreaming of human rights into CFSP/ESDP has 
resulted  in  a  systematic  inclusion  of  human  rights  issues  as  part  of  EUSR 
mandates and the nomination of ‘human rights focal points’ in the teams of the 
Special Representatives. Democracy or democratic principles, on the other hand, 
feature in different and sometimes implicit ways in the EUSR mandates. As an 
example, the EUSR for the South Caucasus is tasked with developing ‘ contacts 
with governments, parliaments, judiciary and civil society in the region’ in order 
‘to assist Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in carrying out political and economic 
reforms, notably in the fields of rule of law, democratisation, human rights, good 
governance, development and poverty reduction.’
33 In line with EU policy for the 
region,  the  role  of  EUSRs  in  the  Balkans  has  a  strong  element  of  democracy 
building even though this is not always clearly spelt out in their mandates (the 
mandates  for  BiH  and  FYROM  do  not  contain  the  words  ‘democracy’  or 
‘democratic’).  The  model  of  ‘double-hatting’  EUSRs
34  in  the  Balkans  is 
interesting  in  ensuring  better  coordination  and  coherence  between  various  EU 
instruments deployed in the region and has also been applied to the newly created 
post of EUSR/Head of Delegation to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa 
                                                 
32 Notwithstanding the role of the Presidency as representative of the Union on all CFSP matters under 
Article 18(1) TEU. 
33 Council Joint Action 2009/133/CFSP of 16 February 2009 extending the mandate of the European 
Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus, OJ L 46/53 of 17.2.2009. 
34 the EUSR for FYROM the same time heads the European Commission Delegation; the EUSR for 
BiH has been appointed High Representative for BiH by the Steering Board of the Peace 
Implementation Council, and the EUSR for Kosovo is International Civilian Representative 
with the task of promoting overall EU political coordination.  
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•  Situations  of  Fragility:  The  EU  response  to  situations  of  fragility  is  not 
specifically geared towards the building of democracy. Current thinking focuses 
rather  on  the  notion  of  state  building  which  is  understood  as  an  endogenous 
process  to  enhance  capacity,  institutions  and  legitimacy  of  the  state  driven  by 
state-society relations. From the outset the focus is therefore rather on looking at 
what works and what are the citizen’s expectations on the ground and, on this 
basis, look for channels to support the country’s resilience by either supporting the 
legitimacy of the state and its institutions (where appropriate — here indeed some 
link  to  democratic  legitimacy)  or  by  other  channels  that  give  space  for  the 
interplay  between  the  state  and  its  society.  Democracy  building  as  such  is 
addressed in this framework in particular by the means of political dialogue and 
peace building activities (e.g. elections), as well as in the framework of support to 
state institutions that adhere to the requirements of democratic governance.  
Crisis management policies and instruments 
 
•  The European Security Strategy (ESS)
35 recognises that ‘The best protection for 
our  security  is  a  world  of  well-governed  democratic  states.  Spreading  good 
governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the 
best means of strengthening the international order.’ 
Most  if  not  all  the  instruments  available  to  implement  the  objectives  of  the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can be used for the purposes of 
democracy  building.  It  difficult  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  individual 
CFSP/ESDP instruments in relation to democracy building. First, the development 
and consolidation of democracy is but one of several CFSP objectives and cannot 
be the sole and overriding consideration in the use of CFSP instruments. Second, 
CFSP/ESDP instruments are often used in conjunction with other instruments and 
used as part of a wider strategy towards a country or region. Any meaningful 
assessment of the effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP instruments towards democracy 
building objectives would have to be done on a case-by-case basis. 
 
•  EU crisis management operations. The European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) has expanded rapidly both as regards the diversity of its actions, their 
geographic scope and the number of missions and operations. While democracy 
building  is  not  a  stated  aim  of  ESDP  missions  as  such,  many  EU  crisis 
management  operations/missions  contribute  to  building  democratic  states, 
democratic governance and the rule of law. Since the first EU police mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched in 2003, the EU has launched a total of 19 
operations  (military)  and  missions  (civilian)  from  the  Western  Balkans  to  the 
                                                 
35  ‘A secure Europe in a better world- The European Security Strategy’ (approved by the European 
Council on 12/13 December 2003).  
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South Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 12 of these are still ongoing as 
of June 2009. The four priority areas for ESDP civilian action identified in 2000
36 
— police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection 
— are of particular relevance to democracy building and there has also been a 
growing demand for security sector reform. Examples of ESDP’s contribution to 
democracy building include: 
−  Police: the EU Police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) aims 
through mentoring, monitoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, 
professional and multiethnic police service in BiH. It also increasingly focuses on 
fighting organised crime and corruption as key spoilers of state-building efforts.  
−  Rule of Law: EULEX KOSOVO, with some 1700 international staff the largest 
ever civilian ESDP mission to date, aims to support the Kosovo authorities by 
monitoring, mentoring and advising on all areas related to the rule of law, in 
particular in the police, judiciary, customs and correctional services. 
−  Security Sector Reform (SSR) helps to establish democratic oversight over the 
armed forces and tries to make respect for the rule of law and human rights 
part of the culture of security forces. EU SSR Guinea Bissau provides advice 
and assistance in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation 
of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.  
EU  crisis  management  operations  contribute  both  directly  and  indirectly  to 
democracy building. Stability and democracy building are mutually reinforcing: a 
certain degree of stability is necessary in order to develop democratic institutions 
and  processes.  EU  military  operations  can  contribute  to  providing  a  safe  and 
secure environment for democracy to take root. On the other hand, democracy is a 
tool for conflict prevention and resolution and stability over the long term can 
only be ensured through legitimate, representative government, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. Civilian ESDP missions in the areas of the rule of law, 
police  or  security  sector  reform  help  put  in  place  key  building  blocks  for 
democracy.  Efforts  to  reinforce  and  if  necessary  restore  credible  local  police 
forces can only be successful if a properly functioning judicial and penitentiary 
system backs up the police forces. EU crisis management is never a stand-alone 
operation  but  is  embedded  in  wider  efforts  to  bring  about  political  change. 
Regular ‘lessons learnt’ exercises are conducted for crisis management operations. 
Efforts to mainstream human rights and gender into ESDP from the first missions 
in  2003  to  today  have  also  started  to  bear  fruit:  for  instance,  there  is  now  a 
compilation of relevant texts for mission planners and it is established practice 
that new missions have a human rights and/or gender advisor as part of their staff.  
 
−  Instrument for Stability — Crisis Response (IfS).
37 The IfS is a completely new 
Instrument and was also adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 
December  2006.  Its  crisis  response  component  builds  on  the  previous  Rapid 
Reaction  Mechanism,  but  with  a  considerable  increase  in  financial  allocations 
                                                 
36 Feira European Council, June 2000. 
37 Regulation (EC) No1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 15.11.2006, OJ L 
327,  24.11.2006,  p.  1.  (see:  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifs/index_en.htm  and 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:327:0001:0011:EN:PDF).  
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(€93 million in 2007, and €128 million in 2008) and in duration of programmes 
(18 months, with the possibility of extension, or of follow-on Interim Response 
Measures). It is global in scope with the main objective to contribute to stability 
by providing an effective response to help preserve, establish or re-establish the 
conditions  essential  to  the  proper  implementation  of  the  Community’s 
development and cooperation policies. Crisis response measures under the IfS do 
address  a  wide  range  of  issues,  including  support  to  mediation,  confidence 
building, and interim administrations, strengthening democracy and the Rule of 
Law,  transitional  Justice,  Disarmament  /  Demobilisation  /  Reintegration  of 
combatants (DDR), equitable access to natural resources, disaster response and 
rehabilitation. Such activities can be supported in situations of crisis or emerging 
crisis, when support can not be provided rapidly enough under other EC financial 
instruments. Typically, the IfS can be mobilised in case of a major new political 
crisis or natural disaster, a window of opportunity to pre-empt a crisis or advance 
on conflict resolution, the urgent need to secure the conditions for the delivery of 
EC  assistance,  or  alongside  CFSP  /  ESDP  actions.  Approval  procedures  are 
designed to ensure rapid adoption of programmes.  
While the IfS operates from a crisis response and conflict mitigation perspective, 
it is also designed to support democracy building, especially in fragile and/or post-
conflict settings, as an integral part of conflict resolution and stabilisation, when 
programmable  Instruments  are  not  available  at  short  notice.  Thus,  the  IfS 
Regulation under Article 3.2 specifically foresees: 
•  support  for  the  development  of  democratic,  pluralistic  state  institutions, 
including measures to enhance the role of women in such institutions, effective 
civilian  administration and  related  legal  frameworks  at  national  and  local 
level, an independent judiciary, good governance and law and order; 
•  support for measures to promote and defend respect for human rights and 
fundamental  freedoms,  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law,  and  the  related 
international instruments; 
•  support for measures to support the development and organisation of civil 
society and its participation in the political process, including measures to 
enhance  the  role  of  women  in  such  processes  and  measures  to  promote 
independent, pluralist and professional media. 
Under these provisions, the IfS was mobilised at short notice on several occasions 
since  its  inception,  mainly  in  support  of  urgent  needs  for  contributing  to 
meaningful  and  credible  electoral  processes  in  post-conflict  or  fragile  crisis 
settings: This includes direct support to electoral bodies and civil society actors in 
the  run-up  to  elections  in  Lebanon,  Haiti,  Chad,  Moldova,  Fiji,   epal  and 
Zambia in 2008/2009 (with a focus on electoral bodies), and in Georgia and 
Zimbabwe 2008 (with a focus on civil society actors), for a total of €26.5 million.  
In addition, the IfS was also deployed to address urgent needs in other fields of 
democracy support and consolidation in similar situations: In Burma, following 
the  2007  uprising,  support  was  provided  towards  a  comprehensive  conflict  
EN  39    EN 
mapping with focus on the constitutional roadmap, and also for the mission of UN 
Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari. In Kyrgyzstan, the IfS supports constitutional 
reform  by  providing  expertise  to  the  new  Parliament,  the  Jogorku  Kenesh,  in 
support of ongoing democratic reforms, in particular for the adoption of secondary 
legislation in line with the new constitution. In Armenia, the IfS supports a high-
level advisory expert team to work with the government on democratic reforms in 
line with the ENP action plan in response to the post-electoral conflicts between 
government  and  opposition.  In  Somalia,  rapid  support  was  mobilised  for  the 
Transitional  Federal  Institutions  in  2008  in  an  effort  to  help  re-establish 
democratic governance. 
Overall,  some  15 %  of  the  €220  million  in  IfS  crisis  response  funding  was 
mobilised towards democracy building and support since 2007. 